Background Background Cognitive models
Cognitive models propose that faulty appraisal of anomalous propose that faulty appraisal of anomalous experiences is critical in developing experiences is critical in developing psychosis, particularly delusions. A data psychosis, particularly delusions. A data gathering bias may be fundamental to gathering bias may be fundamental to abnormal appraisal. abnormal appraisal.
Aims Aims To examine whether there is a
To examine whether there is a data gathering bias in people at high risk of data gathering bias in people at high risk of developing psychosis. developing psychosis.
Method Method Individuals with an at-risk
Individuals with an at-risk mental state ( mental state (n n¼35) were compared with 35) were compared with a matched group of healthy volunteers a matched group of healthy volunteers ( (n n¼23).Participants were tested using a 23).Participants were tested using a modified version of the'beads'reasoning modified version of the'beads'reasoning task with different levels of taskdifficulty. task with different levels of taskdifficulty.
Results
Results When taskdemands were high, When taskdemands were high, the at-risk group made judgements on the the at-risk group made judgements on the basis of less information than the control basis of less information than the control group ( group (P P5 50.05).Within both groups, 0.05).Within both groups, jumping to conclusions was directly jumping to conclusions was directly correlated with the severity of abnormal correlated with the severity of abnormal beliefs and intolerance of uncertainty beliefs and intolerance of uncertainty ( (P P5 50.05) .In the at-risk group it was also 0.05).In the at-risk group it was also associated with impaired working associated with impaired working memory ( memory (P P5 50.05), whereasinthe control 0.05), whereasinthe control group poor working memory was group poor working memory was associated with a more conservative associated with a more conservative response style ( response style (P P5 50.05). 0.05).
Conclusions Conclusions People with an at-risk
People with an at-risk mental state display a jumping to mental state display a jumping to conclusions reasoning style, associated conclusions reasoning style, associated with impaired working memory and with impaired working memory and intolerance of uncertainty.This may intolerance of uncertainty.This may underlie a tendency to develop abnormal underlie a tendency to develop abnormal beliefs and a vulnerability to psychosis. beliefs and a vulnerability to psychosis.
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Both cognitive and neurobiological models Both cognitive and neurobiological models propose that a critical factor in the developpropose that a critical factor in the development of psychosis is the faulty appraisal or ment of psychosis is the faulty appraisal or interpretation of anomalous experiences or interpretation of anomalous experiences or events (Garety & Freeman, 1999 events (Garety & Freeman, 1999 Freeman ; Freeman et al et al, 2002; Kapur, 2003; Broome , 2002; Kapur, 2003; Broome et al et al, , 2005 Broome et al et al, , 2005a Freeman, 2007; Garety ; Freeman, 2007; Garety et al et al, , 2007) . One aspect of appraisal, reasoning, 2007) . One aspect of appraisal, reasoning, can be studied using the 'Beads' paradigm, can be studied using the 'Beads' paradigm, in which the subject is shown a series of in which the subject is shown a series of different coloured beads and is required to different coloured beads and is required to guess which of two jars they have been guess which of two jars they have been drawn from. Patients with psychotic disordrawn from. Patients with psychotic disorders require fewer beads to be drawn before ders require fewer beads to be drawn before they are sure of their source than controls, they are sure of their source than controls, yet are not any less accurate. This 'jumping yet are not any less accurate. This 'jumping to conclusions' response style has been into conclusions' response style has been interpreted as reflecting a data gathering reaterpreted as reflecting a data gathering reasoning bias. As well as in patients with soning bias. As well as in patients with psychosis, jumping to conclusions has been psychosis, jumping to conclusions has been described in volunteers with high levels of described in volunteers with high levels of delusional ideation (Linney delusional ideation (Linney et al et al, 1998) , 1998) and the relatives of patients with psychosis and the relatives of patients with psychosis (Van Dael (Van Dael et al et al, 2006) . In all these groups , 2006). In all these groups jumping to conclusions has been particujumping to conclusions has been particularly associated with the intensity of delularly associated with the intensity of delusional ideation (Linney sional ideation (Linney et al et al, 1998; Garety , 1998; Garety & Freeman, 1999; Peters & Freeman, 1999; Peters et al et al, 1999; Gar-, 1999; Garety ety et al et al, 2005; Van Dael , 2005; Van Dael et al et al, 2006) . , 2006). The mechanisms underlying jumping to The mechanisms underlying jumping to conclusions are unclear, but it has been inconclusions are unclear, but it has been investigated in relation to an impaired ability vestigated in relation to an impaired ability to hold information online (Dudley to hold information online (Dudley et al et al, , 1997 (Dudley et al et al, , 1997a and to an inability to tolerate ambi-) and to an inability to tolerate ambiguity (Colbert & Peters, 2002) . guity (Colbert & Peters, 2002) .
We tested the hypothesis that partiWe tested the hypothesis that participants with an at-risk mental state would cipants with an at-risk mental state would be more likely to jump to conclusions than be more likely to jump to conclusions than controls. Secondary predictions were that controls. Secondary predictions were that the tendency to jump to conclusions would the tendency to jump to conclusions would be associated with impaired working memory be associated with impaired working memory and an intolerance of uncertainty, and would and an intolerance of uncertainty, and would predict the severity of abnormal beliefs. predict the severity of abnormal beliefs.
METHOD METHOD
People with 'prodromal' symptoms of psyPeople with 'prodromal' symptoms of psychosis have a 25-40% risk of developing chosis have a 25-40% risk of developing a psychotic disorder in the next 12 months a psychotic disorder in the next 12 months (Yung (Yung et al et al, 1998 (Yung et al et al, , 2003 Miller , 1998 Miller , , 2003 Miller et al et al, 2003) , et al et al, 2003) , and the diagnosis was con-, 2003) , and the diagnosis was confirmed at a consensus meeting with the clinfirmed at a consensus meeting with the clinical team. None of the participants had ical team. None of the participants had been exposed to antipsychotic medication. been exposed to antipsychotic medication.
Healthy volunteers ( Healthy volunteers (n n¼23) were re-23) were recruited via advertisements in the local cruited via advertisements in the local media. media.
All participants lived in the same borAll participants lived in the same borough of London (Lambeth), were native ough of London (Lambeth), were native speakers of English and were right-handed. speakers of English and were right-handed. The groups were matched on socioThe groups were matched on sociodemographic variables. Participants were demographic variables. Participants were excluded if there was a history of neuroexcluded if there was a history of neurological disorder or if they met DSM-IV crilogical disorder or if they met DSM-IV criteria for a substance misuse or dependence teria for a substance misuse or dependence disorder. disorder.
Assessment of psychopathology Assessment of psychopathology
Psychopathology was assessed using the Psychopathology was assessed using the CAARMS, the Peters' Delusions Inventory CAARMS, the Peters' Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters (PDI; Peters et al et al, 1999) , the Positive and , 1999), the Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS; Kay Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS; Kay et et al al, 1987) and the delusion subscale of the , 1987) and the delusion subscale of the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; Andreason, 1984) . Symptoms (SAPS; Andreason, 1984).
Reasoning task Reasoning task
The tendency for participants to 'jump to The tendency for participants to 'jump to conclusions' was examined using a modiconclusions' was examined using a modified version of the 'beads' reasoning task fied version of the 'beads' reasoning task (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Freeman, (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Freeman, 2007) . In the beads task, participants are 2007). In the beads task, participants are shown two jars of coloured beads, inshown two jars of coloured beads, informed of the relative proportions of beads formed of the relative proportions of beads in each, then told that they will be shown a in each, then told that they will be shown a series of beads drawn from one of the jars. series of beads drawn from one of the jars. They are then asked, on the basis of the obThey are then asked, on the basis of the observed sequence, to judge which jar is the served sequence, to judge which jar is the source of the beads, and to be 'as certain source of the beads, and to be 'as certain s 3 8 s 3 8 B R I T I S H J O UR N A L O F P S YC H I AT RY B R I T I S H J O UR N A L O F P SYC H I AT RY ( 2 0 0 7 ) , 1 9 1 ( s u p p l . 5 1 ) , s 3 8^s 4 2 . d o i : 1 0 . 11 9 2 / b j p . 1 9 1 . 5 1 . s 3 8 ( 2 0 0 7 ) , 1 9 1 ( s u p p l . 5 1 ) , s 3 8^s 4 2 . d o i : 1 0 .11 9 2 / b j p .1 9 1 . 5 1 . as possible', but it is never possible to be as possible', but it is never possible to be completely certain as to which jar the beads completely certain as to which jar the beads have been drawn from (Huq have been drawn from (Huq et al et al, 1988; , 1988; Garety & Freeman, 1999) . Garety & Freeman, 1999) .
As in the classical version of the paraAs in the classical version of the paradigm, participants in our study were indigm, participants in our study were informed that a series of beads would be formed that a series of beads would be drawn from one of two jars containing drawn from one of two jars containing beads of two colours in the ratios 85:15 beads of two colours in the ratios 85:15 and 15:85. They were instructed to monitor and 15:85. They were instructed to monitor the colours of successively drawn beads unthe colours of successively drawn beads until they were as certain as they could be as til they were as certain as they could be as to which of the jars the beads were being to which of the jars the beads were being drawn from. A pseudo-random predeterdrawn from. A pseudo-random predetermined list was used to determine the colour mined list was used to determine the colour of bead shown. Beads were presented on a of bead shown. Beads were presented on a computer screen at 1s intervals, with particomputer screen at 1s intervals, with participants responding via a button press. The cipants responding via a button press. The modified version involved 3 conditions: modified version involved 3 conditions: (a) 2 jars with bead ratios of 85:15, (b) 2 (a) 2 jars with bead ratios of 85:15, (b) 2 jars with 60:40 and (c) 3 jars with jars with 60:40 and (c) 3 jars with 44:28:28. Participants were asked to indi-44:28:28. Participants were asked to indicate which jar the beads were being drawn cate which jar the beads were being drawn from when they were 'as certain as posfrom when they were 'as certain as possible'. Real jars of beads in the appropriate sible'. Real jars of beads in the appropriate ratios and colours were shown to the ratios and colours were shown to the subjects when the task was being explained subjects when the task was being explained beforehand. beforehand.
Working memory Working memory
The ability to hold information about bead The ability to hold information about bead colour online was assessed using an adapcolour online was assessed using an adaptation of the digit span task that used a tation of the digit span task that used a string of different coloured beads (between string of different coloured beads (between 5 and 9; as in the beads task) rather than 5 and 9; as in the beads task) rather than numbers. Participants were presented with numbers. Participants were presented with 5 different length strings of coloured beads, 5 different length strings of coloured beads, 2 trials of each, using a laptop. Beads were 2 trials of each, using a laptop. Beads were presented at 1 s intervals and after presentapresented at 1 s intervals and after presentation participants were asked to recall the tion participants were asked to recall the order of the colour in which beads were order of the colour in which beads were presented. Longest span of beads and total presented. Longest span of beads and total errors were recorded. errors were recorded.
Tolerance of uncertainty Tolerance of uncertainty
Tolerance of uncertainty was evaluated Tolerance of uncertainty was evaluated using the Freeston Intolerance of Uncerusing the Freeston Intolerance of Uncertainty scale (Freeston tainty scale (Freeston et al et al, 1994) . This , 1994) . This questionnaire is a 27-item Likert scale and questionnaire is a 27-item Likert scale and was designed to generate a single summary was designed to generate a single summary score and cover a wide range of concepts, score and cover a wide range of concepts, but factor analyses of the scale identified but factor analyses of the scale identified constructs covering 'behavioural attempts constructs covering 'behavioural attempts to control the future and avoid uncertainty, to control the future and avoid uncertainty, inhibition of action, emotional reactions inhibition of action, emotional reactions such as frustration and stress, and cognitive such as frustration and stress, and cognitive interpretations that being uncertain reflects interpretations that being uncertain reflects badly on a person' (Freeston badly on a person' (Freeston et al et al, 1994; , 1994; p. 799) . Intolerance of uncertainty is p. 799). Intolerance of uncertainty is conceptualised as a manifestation of basic conceptualised as a manifestation of basic dysfunctional (trait) schema that may in dysfunctional (trait) schema that may in turn guide information processing and apturn guide information processing and appraisal. It can generate and maintain anxipraisal. It can generate and maintain anxiety in ambiguous situations both through ety in ambiguous situations both through facilitating the perception of difficulties facilitating the perception of difficulties where none exist, and where difficulties where none exist, and where difficulties do exist, lead to inefficient responses to do exist, lead to inefficient responses to them. them.
IQ IQ
Premorbid and current intellectual function Premorbid and current intellectual function was estimated using the National Adult was estimated using the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1991) . For the delusion sub-scale of the SAPS, the at-risk delusion sub-scale of the SAPS, the at-risk mental state group had a mean score of mental state group had a mean score of 3.9 (s.d. 3.9 (s.d.¼4.0). 4.0).
Beads task Beads task
There was no significant difference in There was no significant difference in performance of the participants with at-risk performance of the participants with at-risk mental state subjects in comparison to the mental state subjects in comparison to the control group on the classical (or 'easy') control group on the classical (or 'easy') version of the beads task: the mean number version of the beads task: the mean number of beads viewed by participants with at-risk of beads viewed by participants with at-risk mental state before they responded was 7.4 mental state before they responded was 7.4 compared to 6.4 for controls ( Fig.  1 ). However, on both of the harder versions 1). However, on both of the harder versions of the task (60:40 and 44:28:28) the at-risk of the task (60:40 and 44:28:28) the at-risk mental state group drew fewer beads than mental state group drew fewer beads than controls before responding. For the intercontrols before responding. For the intermediate version of the task the mean mediate version of the task the mean number of beads viewed by participants number of beads viewed by participants with at-risk mental state before they with at-risk mental state before they responded was 8.5, but for controls was responded was 8.5, but for controls was 13.4 ( 13.4 (P P5 50.001). On the hard version of 0.001). On the hard version of the task, those with at-risk mental state the task, those with at-risk mental state viewed 12.5 beads and controls 17.5 viewed 12.5 beads and controls 17.5 ( (P P¼0.012). (Fig. 1, Table 1 ). Both these 0.012). (Fig. 1, Table 1 ). Both these differences in performance remained sigdifferences in performance remained significant after co-varying for differences in nificant after co-varying for differences in NART score. NART score.
Delusional ideation Delusional ideation
There were highly significant differences There were highly significant differences between the at-risk mental state and conbetween the at-risk mental state and control groups on the total PDI score, and on trol groups on the total PDI score, and on each of the distress, preoccupation and coneach of the distress, preoccupation and conviction sub-scales. On all these measures viction sub-scales. On all these measures the at-risk mental state group scored higher the at-risk mental state group scored higher than controls. (Table 2 ). than controls. (Table 2 ).
Working memory Working memory
The at-risk mental state group had a signifThe at-risk mental state group had a significantly shorter span for correct responses icantly shorter span for correct responses than controls on the beads span task, and than controls on the beads span task, and made significantly more errors (Table 2) . made significantly more errors ( Table 2) .
Intolerance of uncertainty Intolerance of uncertainty
The at-risk mental state group had sigThe at-risk mental state group had significantly higher ratings on the Freeston nificantly higher ratings on the Freeston Intolerance of Uncertainty scale than Intolerance of Uncertainty scale than controls (Table 2) . controls (Table 2 ).
Correlations with beads task Correlations with beads task performance performance
PDI scores PDI scores
For both groups on both the intermediate For both groups on both the intermediate and hard conditions of the beads task there and hard conditions of the beads task there was an inverse relationship between the was an inverse relationship between the number of beads viewed before the renumber of beads viewed before the response and scores on the PDI and each of sponse and scores on the PDI and each of its sub-scales. These were statistically sigits sub-scales. These were statistically significant for the total PDI score and all three nificant for the total PDI score and all three PDI sub-scales on intermediate (60:40) ver-PDI sub-scales on intermediate (60:40) version of the task and evident as trends for sion of the task and evident as trends for the hard version (Table 3 ). The strongest the hard version (Table 3 ). The strongest and most significant correlation was with and most significant correlation was with scores on the conviction sub-scale of the scores on the conviction sub-scale of the PDI. There were no significant correlations PDI. There were no significant correlations between performance on the easy (85:15) between performance on the easy (85:15) version and any of the PDI measures. version and any of the PDI measures.
Intolerance of uncertainty Intolerance of uncertainty
In both groups the number of beads viewed In both groups the number of beads viewed was inversely related to the Intolerance of was inversely related to the Intolerance of Uncertainty score, with a significant correUncertainty score, with a significant correlation on the intermediate version and a lation on the intermediate version and a trend on the hard version of the task trend on the hard version of the task (Table 3) . (Table 3) .
Symptom scores Symptom scores
Within the at-risk mental state group there Within the at-risk mental state group there were no significant or trend correlations were no significant or trend correlations s 3 9 s 3 9 between task performance (on any version) between task performance (on any version) and either the PANSS (both total score and and either the PANSS (both total score and positive sub-scale), or the delusion subpositive sub-scale), or the delusion subscale of the SAPS. scale of the SAPS.
Working memory Working memory
There were no significant correlations beThere were no significant correlations between performance on the beads task and tween performance on the beads task and the bead span across both groups of partithe bead span across both groups of participants combined, but there were correlacipants combined, but there were correlations within each group. In controls the tions within each group. In controls the number of beads drawn in all versions of number of beads drawn in all versions of the task was directly correlated with the the task was directly correlated with the number of errors on the bead span task, number of errors on the bead span task, although this only reached significance on although this only reached significance on the intermediate version (Table 4) . Conthe intermediate version (Table 4) . Conversely, in the at-risk mental state group versely, in the at-risk mental state group there was a negative correlation between there was a negative correlation between beads viewed and errors on the bead span beads viewed and errors on the bead span task. Again this was only significant on task. Again this was only significant on the intermediate version of the task (Table 4) . the intermediate version of the task (Table 4) .
DISCUSSION DISCUSSION

Jumping to conclusions Jumping to conclusions
Our first hypothesis was confirmed in that Our first hypothesis was confirmed in that the at-risk mental state group demonstrated the at-risk mental state group demonstrated a jumping to conclusions style of thinking, a jumping to conclusions style of thinking, although this was evident when the task dealthough this was evident when the task demands were increased by making the promands were increased by making the proportions of the respective beads more portions of the respective beads more similar (60:40) or by introducing a third similar (60:40) or by introducing a third colour of bead (44:28:28), rather than durcolour of bead (44:28:28), rather than during the 'classic' (85:15) version. Our finding the 'classic' (85:15) version. Our findings are consistent with those of Linney ings are consistent with those of Linney et et al al (Linney (Linney et al et al, 1998) , who reported that , 1998), who reported that non-clinical individuals with high scores non-clinical individuals with high scores on the PDI showed a jumping to concluon the PDI showed a jumping to conclusions response style, although in that case sions response style, although in that case differences were evident using the classical differences were evident using the classical version of the task. Our findings are also version of the task. Our findings are also consistent with work demonstrating an asconsistent with work demonstrating an association between a jumping to conclusions sociation between a jumping to conclusions bias and both psychosis liability (as indexed bias and both psychosis liability (as indexed by family history of psychosis and/or psyby family history of psychosis and/or psychotic experiences) and delusional ideation chotic experiences) and delusional ideation (Linney (Linney et al et al, 1998; Peters , 1998; Peters et al et al, 1999; , 1999; Van Dael Van Dael et al et al, 2006) . While the jumping , 2006). While the jumping to conclusions style of thinking in subjects to conclusions style of thinking in subjects at very high risk of psychosis has not been at very high risk of psychosis has not been examined before, the at-risk mental state examined before, the at-risk mental state has been associated with deficits in working has been associated with deficits in working and episodic memory and executive funcand episodic memory and executive functions (Wood tions (Wood et al et al, 2003; Brewer , 2003; Brewer et al et al, , 2005; Broome 2005; Broome et al et al, 2007 Broome et al et al, , submitted -, 2007 , submittedfurther information available from author). further information available from author). Further, recent work on the bias in groups Further, recent work on the bias in groups at differing liability to at differing liability to psychotic illness, psychotic illness, has revealed a dosehas revealed a dose-response relationresponse relationship between the jumping to conclusions ship between the jumping to conclusions bias and both delusional ideation and bias and both delusional ideation and psychosis liability (Van Dael psychosis liability (Van Dael et al et al, 2006); , 2006) ; leading to the suggestion that the jumping leading to the suggestion that the jumping to conclusions bias is both a trait and state to conclusions bias is both a trait and state variable in the risk and progression of variable in the risk and progression of psychosis. psychosis. The finding that jumping to conclusions The finding that jumping to conclusions bias is present in those at high risk of psybias is present in those at high risk of psychosis is consistent with cognitive models chosis is consistent with cognitive models that suggest that the faulty appraisal of that suggest that the faulty appraisal of anomalous experiences plays a fundamenanomalous experiences plays a fundamental role in the development of the disorder tal role in the development of the disorder (Broome (Broome et al et al, 2005 (Broome et al et al, , 2005a Garety ; Garety et al et al, 2005 Garety et al et al, , , 2005 Garety et al et al, , 2007 . While 'jumping to conclusions' has 2007). While 'jumping to conclusions' has consistently been found in patients with consistently been found in patients with established psychosis (Garety & Freeman, established psychosis (Garety & Freeman, 1999) , its presence in individuals at very 1999), its presence in individuals at very high risk of the disorder suggests that the high risk of the disorder suggests that the presence of this impairment may influence presence of this impairment may influence whether an individual who is experiencing whether an individual who is experiencing psychotic symptoms progresses to frank psychotic symptoms progresses to frank psychosis. Van Dael and colleagues (2006) psychosis. Van Dael and colleagues (2006) suggest that the jumping to conclusions suggest that the jumping to conclusions bias, as well as being a trait vulnerability, bias, as well as being a trait vulnerability, may have a state component and one would may have a state component and one would expect such a bias to increase, and be expect such a bias to increase, and be detectable at lower levels of task demand, detectable at lower levels of task demand, as at-risk mental state participants made as at-risk mental state participants made the transition to psychosis. Conversely, the transition to psychosis. Conversely, those in whom the at-risk mental state rethose in whom the at-risk mental state remitted may demonstrate an attenuation of mitted may demonstrate an attenuation of the jumping to conclusions bias. This could the jumping to conclusions bias. This could be tested in a longitudinal study of subjects be tested in a longitudinal study of subjects with an at-risk mental state. with an at-risk mental state.
Jumping to conclusions
Jumping to conclusions and the severity of abnormal beliefs and the severity of abnormal beliefs Consistent with previous studies (Garety Consistent with previous studies (Garety et et al al, 2005) , we found that jumping to , 2005), we found that jumping to conclusions response style was associated conclusions response style was associated with the severity of abnormal beliefs, as inwith the severity of abnormal beliefs, as indexed by the PDI. However, this finding dexed by the PDI. However, this finding was evident across all subjects, rather than was evident across all subjects, rather than s 4 0 s 4 0 AUTHOR'S PROOF AUTHOR'S PROOF Maximum bead span Maximum bead span 7.8 (0.6) 7.8 (0.6) 6.6 (1.0) 6.6 (1.0) 0.000 0.000
Total errors on bead span Total errors on bead span 3.7 (3.4) 3.7 (3.4) 10.2 (8.9) 10.2 (8.9) 0.00 0.001 1 being specific to the at-risk mental state being specific to the at-risk mental state group. This is further evidence that rather group. This is further evidence that rather than being a correlate of frank psychosis, than being a correlate of frank psychosis, the tendency to jump to conclusions may the tendency to jump to conclusions may vary continuously across clinical categories. vary continuously across clinical categories. The association with delusions does not The association with delusions does not seem simply to reflect jumping to concluseem simply to reflect jumping to conclusions in those subjects with the most psysions in those subjects with the most psychotic symptoms, as there was no chotic symptoms, as there was no correlation with either the total PANSS correlation with either the total PANSS score or the positive symptom sub-scale, score or the positive symptom sub-scale, or with the SAPS delusion sub-scale score. or with the SAPS delusion sub-scale score.
A specific association with delusions is con-A specific association with delusions is consistent with studies in established psychosis sistent with studies in established psychosis (Garety & Freeman, 1999) and has face (Garety & Freeman, 1999) and has face validity, in that of all the psychotic sympvalidity, in that of all the psychotic symptoms, abnormal beliefs are the most depentoms, abnormal beliefs are the most dependent on the participant's interpretation of dent on the participant's interpretation of his experiences. A parsimonious interprethis experiences. A parsimonious interpretation of the data would be that jumping ation of the data would be that jumping to conclusions is a sign of faulty appraisal, to conclusions is a sign of faulty appraisal, which is the basis of delusional beliefs, rewhich is the basis of delusional beliefs, regardless of whether these are held by an gardless of whether these are held by an individual with psychosis, at-risk mental individual with psychosis, at-risk mental state, or without psychosis. According to state, or without psychosis. According to this model, the worse the jumping to conthis model, the worse the jumping to conclusions, the more severe the appraisal proclusions, the more severe the appraisal problem and the more severe the delusions. blem and the more severe the delusions. Faulty appraisal may not distinguish people Faulty appraisal may not distinguish people with psychotic symptoms from people with with psychotic symptoms from people with a psychotic illness in a categorical way, a psychotic illness in a categorical way, rather faulty appraisal may underlie the rather faulty appraisal may underlie the subset of psychotic symptoms that depend subset of psychotic symptoms that depend on the conscious evaluation of sensory/inon the conscious evaluation of sensory/internal information, i.e. delusional beliefs ternal information, i.e. delusional beliefs (and perhaps hallucinations), as opposed (and perhaps hallucinations), as opposed to the syndrome of psychosis. Appraisal to the syndrome of psychosis. Appraisal and jumping to conclusions may be less reand jumping to conclusions may be less relevant to psychotic symptoms that are less levant to psychotic symptoms that are less dependent on the conscious appraisal of dependent on the conscious appraisal of experiences, for example formal thought experiences, for example formal thought disorder, negative symptoms. disorder, negative symptoms.
Jumping to conclusions Jumping to conclusions and intolerance of uncertainty and intolerance of uncertainty
The basis of the data gathering bias is unclear. The basis of the data gathering bias is unclear. One factor may be the decision-making One factor may be the decision-making style of the individual. Although jumping style of the individual. Although jumping to conclusions is not simply related to imto conclusions is not simply related to impulsivity (Dudley pulsivity (Dudley et al et al, 1997 (Dudley et al et al, , 1997a , it may ), it may be more evident in individuals who find it be more evident in individuals who find it difficult to tolerate ambiguity (Colbert & difficult to tolerate ambiguity (Colbert & Peters, 2002) . The at-risk mental state Peters, 2002) . The at-risk mental state group scored higher on the Intolerance of group scored higher on the Intolerance of Uncertainty scale than controls. Difficulties Uncertainty scale than controls. Difficulties tolerating uncertainty may thus have contolerating uncertainty may thus have contributed to the jumping to conclusions retributed to the jumping to conclusions response style in the at-risk mental state sponse style in the at-risk mental state group. As with the PDI, there was a signifigroup. As with the PDI, there was a significant correlation across both groups becant correlation across both groups between intolerance of uncertainty and the tween intolerance of uncertainty and the data gathering bias. The group differences data gathering bias. The group differences in tolerating uncertainty may be related to in tolerating uncertainty may be related to the relatively high prevalence of personality the relatively high prevalence of personality and neurotic disorder among participants and neurotic disorder among participants with at-risk mental state (Broome with at-risk mental state (Broome et al et al, , 2005 (Broome et al et al, , 2005b . ).
Jumping to conclusions Jumping to conclusions and working memory and working memory
Another factor that could contribute to Another factor that could contribute to jumping to conclusions is impaired working jumping to conclusions is impaired working memory, with subjects making earlier memory, with subjects making earlier decisions because of difficulties holding decisions because of difficulties holding material that would inform their judgement material that would inform their judgement online, although the evidence for this is limonline, although the evidence for this is limited. Consistent with previous studies of ited. Consistent with previous studies of working memory in participants with working memory in participants with at-risk mental state (Wood at-risk mental state (Wood et al et al, 2003; , 2003; Brewer Brewer et al et al, 2005; Brett , 2005; Brett et al et al, 2007 Brett et al et al, , in , 2007 ), the at-risk mental state group dispress), the at-risk mental state group displayed poorer performance on the bead played poorer performance on the bead span task than controls. This is consistent span task than controls. This is consistent with our prediction that impaired working with our prediction that impaired working memory would contribute to a jumping to memory would contribute to a jumping to conclusions response style. Moreover jumpconclusions response style. Moreover jumping to conclusions on one of the harder vering to conclusions on one of the harder versions (60:40 bead ratio) of the beads task in sions (60:40 bead ratio) of the beads task in the at-risk mental state group was correthe at-risk mental state group was correlated with impaired performance on the lated with impaired performance on the beads span task. These data suggest that a beads span task. These data suggest that a difficulty in holding information online difficulty in holding information online may contribute to participants making judmay contribute to participants making judgements in which they can never be certain gements in which they can never be certain sooner than they might do otherwise. sooner than they might do otherwise. Dudley Dudley et al et al (1997 Dudley et al et al ( (1997a did not find an asso-) did not find an association between jumping to conclusions reciation between jumping to conclusions response style and memory impairments in sponse style and memory impairments in patients with psychosis, but this may reflect patients with psychosis, but this may reflect the use of the classical beads task without the use of the classical beads task without the more difficult conditions, or the fact the more difficult conditions, or the fact being reminded of the beads one has seen being reminded of the beads one has seen does not guarantee that that information does not guarantee that that information is itself able to be utilised in reasoning. In is itself able to be utilised in reasoning. In the present study, the effect of memory imthe present study, the effect of memory impairment was divergent in the two groups: pairment was divergent in the two groups: in the control group, there was an increased in the control group, there was an increased conservatism and caution in those with conservatism and caution in those with poorer ability to recall sequences of beads, poorer ability to recall sequences of beads, the opposite to what was evident in the the opposite to what was evident in the at-risk mental state group. This suggests at-risk mental state group. This suggests that controls with poor working memory that controls with poor working memory compensated by seeking more information, compensated by seeking more information, or did not find being uncertain how to reor did not find being uncertain how to respond as aversive as the participants at-risk. spond as aversive as the participants at-risk.
In summary, people who are at high In summary, people who are at high risk of psychosis display a jumping to conrisk of psychosis display a jumping to conclusions reasoning style which is associated clusions reasoning style which is associated s 4 1 s 4 1 AUTHOR'S PROOF AUTHOR'S PROOF 
